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With controversial arguments on the prime function of a board of directors, this 
study aim to determine the major role of the board in Korean companies, and to 
address the possible change caused by cultural factors in the role of the board. 
This research explores the issues in perspective of agency theory, resource 
dependence theory, and stakeholders theory; moderating effects of independent 
directors and Anglo-Saxon directors on the relationship between organizational 
slack and CSR investment are also empirically examined. Using data of 1,662 
publicly traded Korean manufacturing firms gathered within the  period of 2008 
to 2013, the study shows that independent directors strengthen the relationship 
between organizational slack and CSR investment in Korean firms, whereby 
Anglo-Saxon directors, who are mostly from countries with shareholder-
centered view of corporate law, weaken the relationship, provided, that they 
exceeded non-Anglo-Saxon directors in number. One possible explanation for 
the former finding is that key functions of a board of directors in Korean firms 
may be to advise managers and to provide resources to firms, lending supports 
to resource dependent theory and stakeholders theory perspectives. The latter 
result, on the other hand, indicates that a prime role of the board could appeal in 
a different way, drawing on cultural factors such as the country’s corporate law 
tradition.  
Keywords: Board of directors; Organizational slack; Corporate Social 
Responsibility; Agency theory; Resource dependence theory; Stakeholders 
theory 
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To date, the role of a board of directors (BOD) and the impact on firms’ strategic 
behavior have been one of the favorite topics for management scholars. This 
growing attention for directors seems to represent their importance in firm 
management; however, previous studies have shown two controversial theories 
to explain the key function of boards. One explains directors as monitoring body 
to control managements, while the other regards them as advisors for managers 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
Agency theory, one theoretical base, argues that the primary function of 
a board would be to control managers’ self-interest behavior. As a monitoring 
force, this internal mechanism also helps to reduce agent cost on behalf of 
shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
Resource dependence theory, another theoretical base, views that the 
major role of the board is to provide important resources for the company, such 




2003). As resource providers, board members are also expected to support and 
advise CEOs to manage corporations, and to respond to surrounding 
environment (Boyd, 1990). 
Although considerable research has been done, defining the role of a 
board in accordance with one of these theories (i.e., agency theory or resource 
dependence theory), and then being devoted to explaining the effect of a board 
to firm’s strategy, rather less attention has been paid to reveal which function is 
more emphasized in specific country, and how this monitoring or supporting 
function could be changed with cultural influence on the board.  
In this study, we try to ascertain the major function of a board of 
directors in Korea, and to address the possible change caused by cultural factors 
in the role of the board. Specifically, we identify the key function of the board 
by examining the moderating effect of outside directors on the relationship 
between organizational slack and CSR investment in Korean companies. 
Various research conducted on organizational slack and CSR investment 




Arora, 2008; Seifert et al., 2004; Buchholtz et al., 1999; Waddock and Graves, 
1997); thus, we might determine the role of a board in Korea, observing a 
positive or negative moderating effect of it on slack-CSR relationship. We also 
try to assess the cultural influence on the role of the board by testing the 
moderating effect of foreign directors from different countries on slack-CSR 
relationship.  
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the next Section, the literature is 
reviewed in order to argue upon the theoretical bases on the role of a board of 
directors. In Section 3, hypotheses are developed; methodology is then 
described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and finally, 






II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Agency theory and resource dependence theory  
Agency theory represents that a critical function of a board of directors is to 
monitor and control opportunistic behavior of managers on behalf of 
shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As an internal 
mechanism to reduce agency cost, a board is expected to make sure that 
managers’ action is aligned with shareholders’ interest by policing 
managements (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
 Resource dependence theory, on the other hand, provides an opposite 
view for explaining a function of a board. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) state, 
a firm is considered to be a reliant organization on its external environment. 
Proponents of this view argue that a core function of a board is to offer valuable 
resources to the firm so that directors could support and advise managers 
effectively (Ayuso and Argandoña, 2007). The board, accordingly, is supposed 
to offer advice and counsel to managements; to provide linkages to external 




communications with external communities (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Of 
considerable importance, these linkages and supports from outside of the 
company often enable the firm to moderate its dependency to external 
environment, thus declining its uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). In doing so, a firm could be able to understand and respond to 
surrounding organizations and environment more effectively (Boyd, 1990). 
2. Organizational slack and CSR  
Cyert and March (1963) suggests that organizational slack is surplus or 
unoccupied resource; in other words, the resource that exceeds the minimum 
requirement to manage a firm. Nohria and Gulati (1996) also define 
organizational slack as spare resource after producing appointed amount of 
output. Organizational slack, thus, is often referred to as a “cushion of actual or 
potential resources” for a firm’s strategic decision so that it enables the firm to 
successfully respond to internal or external pressures for changes (Bourgeois, 




teams as well as a firm’s strategic behavior including discretionary issues such 
as CSR could be affected (Buchholtz et al., 1999).     
Much research has been conducted on organizational slack and its effect 
on a firm’s various decision makings. Among those strategic decisions, 
investment in CSR has been paid growing attention by management scholars. 
Arora (2008) determines a positive relationship between organizational slack 
and corporate social performance (CSP), focusing on discretionary properties of 
organizational slack and CSP. Seifert et al. (2004) undertakes a study on 
organizational slack and a firm’s charitable donations, measuring organizational 
slack by cash flow which is one of the most discretionary kinds of slack. 
Buchholtz et al. (1999) also suggests a positive relationship in organizational 
slack and a firm’s philanthropic giving. In addition, Waddock and Graves (1997) 
states that existence of uncommitted resources could offer a company 
opportunities to be engaged in social causes such as CSR. CSR investment, 




While organizational slack has proven to be one of the major 
antecedents of CSR investment decision in previous studies, effective boards 
might moderate the tendency. As noted earlier, conflicting theories explain two 
different functions of boards. Agency theorists assert that boards have 
monitoring functions to govern managers’ opportunistic behavior; on the 
contrary, resource dependence theorists emphasize advising roles of them 
(Hillman et al., 2000); thus, directors are able to help a corporation to respond 
to surrounding environment effectively as resource providers (Boyd, 1990). 
With boards being tested as a moderator, moderating effect on the relationship 
between organizational slack and CSR would be presented in a different way. 
Between these two theories explaining the role of BOD, accordingly, we might 
identify which theory dominates the relationship.  
 More specifically, when board members work as monitoring bodies for 
top management teams, a relationship between slack and CSR might be 
moderated in negative way by the board factors, indicating that agency 




of boards is to provide core resources for a firm, the board factors are more likely 
to moderate slack and CSR relationship in a positive direction; they might 
enable managers to foster CSR investment. In this situation, resource 
dependence perspective could be suggested to dominate the relationship. 
3. Agency theory, slack, and CSR  
To date, much research on CSR has been undertaken by both opponents and 
proponents. The key opposition to CSR stems from agency theory’s stance, 
which states that the major objective of managements is to increase shareholders’ 
value. In this perspective, Friedman (1970) suggests that managers, as agents of 
shareholders, should not give away shareholders’ money without knowing their 
intention. Investment in CSR, therefore, could not be justified if the action has 
failed to maximize shareholders’ welfare; otherwise, it may indicate a misuse of 
shareholders’ money (Buchholtz et al., 1999; Friedman, 1970).  
CSR investment, however, might increase with availability of 
uncommitted resources. Existence of slack resources, often being referred to as 




determines level of shareholders’ satisfaction (Bourgeois, 1981). With a firm 
possessing appropriate level of slack resources, shareholders’ satisfaction is 
expected to incline, which enables manages to be much less responsible for 
shareholders’ demand (Arora and Dharwadka, 2011). Under this circumstance, 
the company might have high opportunity to be engaged in discretionary 
activities with social causes, thus leading to more investments in CSR (e.g., 
Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
 Agency theorists also argue that investment in CSR is more likely to be 
against shareholders’ preference since no direct financial benefit is affirmed to 
shareholders (Wang and Coffey, 1992). Managers, however, may have 
incentives to seek CSR because they do not have any residual claims on 
company’s income. By committing slack resources to CSR activities, managers 
could obtain opportunities to be members of social elites (Coffey and Wang, 
1998), to impress important stakeholders or community influences, and to put 




these incentives, managers are more expected than shareholders to pursue CSR 
investment.  
4. Stakeholders theory, resource dependence theory, 
slack, and CSR  
An alternative approach, stakeholder theory, provides another rationale to 
explain a firm’s CSR investment. As Freeman (2010) states, stakeholders are 
“any groups or individuals who can affect or are affected by the achievements 
of the firm’s objectives.” The theory then argues that merely meeting 
shareholders’ demands is not enough (Collier, 2008) because the major 
objective of a company is to satisfy stakeholders of the firm with different 
interests (Ansoff, 1965). Stakeholder theory, accordingly, takes external 
environment surrounding a firm into account. Furthermore, Buhl (1996) also 
suggests that a firm has a social role to play as a reciprocity for being provided 
with opportunities to operate in marketplace.    
In this perspective, board resources are expected to aid firms to 




stakeholders in society. Stakeholders theory addresses that a board of directors, 
as a major governing body of corporations, has obligation to preserve 
stakeholders’ demands (Hill and Jones, 1992). Meanwhile, resource dependence 
theory proposes that boards could be able to carry out their duties by providing 
needed resources for firms to understand and respond to surrounding 
environment (Boyd, 1990). Bear et al. (2010) also suggests that the potential for 
problem solving and external environment understanding is more likely to be 
enhanced when boards effectively and responsibly perform their obligations as 
resource providers. This effectiveness of boards as resource providers might be 
achieved through combined knowledge and skills of the directors involving 
linkages to external influentials or stakeholders (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
These network ties to outside of firms would also be able to provide connections 
to external organizations, thus increasing understandings to external 
circumstances (Beckman and Haunschild, 2002).  
 Considering these dependencies on environment and possible aids from 




Velamuri (2006) even asserts that firms pursue CSR to undertake their 
obligation, which is to enhance stakeholders’ welfare. Barnett (2007) also 
argues that CSR could be a means to develop a sincere relationship with key 
stakeholders, which leads to create stakeholders’ value and to promote social 
welfare. 
5. Integrating organizational slack, CSR, and BOD  
As discussed before, much research has proposed a positive relationship 
between organizational slack and CSR investment (e.g., Arora, 2008; Seifert et 
al., 2004; Buchholtz et al., 1999; Waddock and Graves, 1997), and that it could 
be moderated by functions of boards. This moderating effect, however, could 
also function in the opposite direction depending upon whether the key role of 
boards is to monitor managements, or to advise them as resource providers.  
If the major function of a board is to monitor top managements’ 
behavior on behalf of shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), the relationship between organizational slack and CSR would be 




benefits to shareholders, thus being against shareholders’ preference (Wang and 
Coffey, 1992). As in agency theorists’ argument, accordingly, a board is 
expected to screen CSR investment. In other words, directors are hires to contain 
managers’ actions that do not align with shareholders’ interests; therefore, an 
effectively functioning board is supposed to deter and eliminate managers’ 
intention for CSR investment (Coffey and Wang, 1998). In accordance, an 
effective board would negatively moderate the relationship between slack and 
CSR.  
Nevertheless, if the prime role of a board is to advise top managers as a 
resource provider, the relationship between organizational slack and CSR would 
be positively moderated. Stakeholders theorists argue that a board should 
preserve stakeholders’ needs (Hill and Jones, 1992) because the major objective 
of a company is to create stakeholders’ value (Ansoff, 1965). CSR is thus to be 
promoted as a means to achieve a firm’s objectives, and also to develop sincere 
relationships with key stakeholders (Barnett, 2007). Resource dependence 




to enhance stakeholders’ value, and to help them to understand and respond to 
external environment (Boyd, 1990). With the effectively performing board, a 
firm’s potential for problem solving abilities and external environment 
understanding could be enhanced (Bear et al., 2010). As in the perspectives of 
stakeholders theory and resource dependence theory, a board is more likely to 
foster CSR investment; therefore, an effective board would positively moderate 






1. Organizational slack and CSR 
Before determining a positive or negative moderating effect of boards, the 
relationship between organizational slack and CSR should be addressed. As 
slack resources are considered as main antecedents to influence managers’ 
decision on CSR investment, the relationship between organizational slack and 
CSR investment has been much discussed by management scholars. Arora 
(2008), for example, asserts that organizational slack positively affects a firm’s 
corporate social performance (CSP); Seifert et al. (2004) proposes a positive 
relationship between slack and a firm’s charitable donations; Buchholtz et al. 
(1999), Waddock and Graves (1997) also present the similar results.  
Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed: 
Hypothesis 1. Organizational slack would be positively associated with 




2. Independent directors 
To identify the key function of a board, a moderating effect of outside directors 
on the relationship between organizational slack and CSR investment would be 
examined.  
Boards of directors consist of inside directors, who currently or 
formerly have served for the firm as management team members or employees; 
dependent outside directors, who either are family members or have direct or 
indirect relationships with managers; and independent outside directors who 
have no kind of relationships with the organization (Ayuso and Argandoña, 
2007).  
Among those directors, in agency theory’s perspective, independent 
directors are regarded as prime factors that have much influence on the 
monitoring function of boards. Boards’ effectiveness in monitoring could be 
enhanced with existence of independent outside directors because their interests 
are usually not align with those of managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen 




Furthermore, agency theorists argue that independent directors, who are 
primarily hired to monitor managers’ opportunistic behavior and thus to protect 
shareholders’ value, might not consider CSR investment as one of the value-
enhancing activities since it assures no predictable return on a company’s profit 
(Arora and Dharwadka, 2011). Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) also ascertains 
that independent directors are likely to support the decision that is based on 
historically proved information rather than investment with great uncertainties. 
Managers, on the contrary, are suggested to have incentives to pursue CSR 
investment in previous studies: they might be members of social elites (Coffey 
and Wang, 1998); they could impress important community influences by 
improving their image (Haley, 1991).  
Therefore, to deter managerial opportunism, independent directors may 
oppose a firm engaged in CSR investment. As the proportion of them on boards 
increases, effectiveness of boards’ monitoring function might also incline, 
limiting uncertain investments including CSR.  




Hypothesis 2a. The effect of organizational slack on CSR would be 
negatively moderated by the increase in the proportion of independent 
directors on the board.  
As discussed above, on the contrast, resource dependence theorists view 
that the prime function of a board is to help managements, providing them 
valuable resources including counselling, advising, and communicating 
channels to external environment (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  
Following this logic, existence of independent directors on the board 
could improve further effectiveness of it as a resource provider, by offering 
managements more informatics resources than that of insiders, since outsiders 
might be more experienced with external stakeholders’ needs (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999). Also, outside directors are assumed to be more sensitive to 
various stakeholders’ demands and to be more active in responding to outside 
society (Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1995). Furthermore, they usually do not feel 
pressures despite intense competition with a competing industry (Sonnenfeld, 




focus too much on firms’ short-term financial performances (Ibrahim and 
Angelidis, 1994; Ibrahim et al., 2003). Independent directors, accordingly, are 
expected to be more supportive on costly investments (Johnson and Greening, 
1999), such as CSR. 
As the proportion of outside directors on boards increases, thus, CSR 
investment could be fostered, enhancing understandings on external 
stakeholders and society.  
Therefore, the following hypothesis is derived:    
Hypothesis 2b. The effect of organizational slack on CSR would be 
positively moderated by the increase in the proportion of independent 
directors on the board. 
3. Foreign directors 
Although the prime function of a board may probably be identified by the result 
of the hypotheses developed above, cultural backgrounds of directors could also 




is to be tested by observing moderating effect of foreign directors from different 
countries on slack-CSR relationship.  
 As Schneper and Guillén (2004) suggests, legal tradition of a country, 
which forms a base for corporate law, would have an influence on extents of 
shareholder rights’ protection. They also state that corporate law follows a 
country’s economic, military, and cultural factors. In addition, a country’s 
corporate law could greatly affect a firm’s corporate governance, which is most 
commonly differentiated into shareholder-centered model or stakeholder-
centered model (Roe, 2000). Many countries adopt either shareholder-centered 
or stakeholder-centered model, according to their legal tradition, and corporate 
law.  
 Shareholder-centered model of corporate governance is mostly based 
on English common law, emphasizing “external” mechanisms―i.e. widely held 
ownership, efficient marketplace―to control managers (Roe, 2000). Countries 
under common law tradition include most of former British colonies: US, 




board would be functioning as one of the mechanisms to monitor managements’ 
behavior.  
On the sharp contrast, stakeholder-centered model has its foundation on 
German civil law; countries adhere to this model of corporate governance 
greatly focus on “internal” mechanisms, which include advising BOD who 
actively relies on the cooperation with outside stakeholders to affect 
managements (Schneper and Guillén 2004). German, Japan, Korea and many of 
other countries which had not been British colonies follow stakeholder-centered 
view of the firm.  
Foreign directors, therefore, are more likely to be influenced by the 
legal tradition and corporate law of their native countries. Accordingly, directors 
from the countries with common law tradition (i.e., US, UK, and other former 
British colonies) might follow shareholder-centered behavior, performing as 
monitoring bodies of managements. Foreign directors from the other countries, 




would support managements as resource providers, helping managers 
understand and deal with external environment more effectively.  
This formulates the final hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3. The effect of organizational slack on CSR Investment 
would be negatively moderated when the number of foreign directors 
from countries with shareholder-centered view is larger than that of 
foreign directors from countries with stakeholder-centered view on the 






1. Study sample and data  
In order to investigate the prime function of a board of directors, we establish 
empirical setting to examine the hypotheses in Korean context. As far as we 
know, most of studies on the role of a board have been undertaken in Western 
context, while little research had been conducted in non-Western context, 
especially in Korean. As one of the Asian countries that are expected to follow 
a different type of corporate law than of western countries, Korea would provide 
a meaningful setting for determining the major function of a board.  
 Every firm in Korea traded in Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) has 
mandatorily contained outside members on the board since 1994, the year when 
Securities Exchange Act was amended; Korea Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (KOSDAQ), also, have been applied to the same Act since 2004. 
Considering the possible lag time of the Act to take actual effects on most of the 
traded companies, we established the period for the data-search would be set as 




 Meanwhile, the sample was selected from all manufacturing firms 
which had been listed on the KSE and KOSDAQ. Companies in banks/financial 
service industries, on the other hand, were excluded because of the different 
accounting practice and regulatory in those industries. We also excluded the 
firms with omitted variables. As a result, the final sample was composed of 
1,662 firms for 2008–2013. 
The information regarding boards of directors are generated from 
TS2000. Data on all the other variables was obtained from FnGuide, being also 
cross-checked with data gathered from KISVALUE.  
2. Statistical analysis 
As the data for this research is a balanced panel data with six years’ time periods, 
a random effects model was used to analyze the sample. The random effects 
model is considered to estimate the sample more efficiently than the fixed-





1) Dependent variable 
CSR investment  
CSR investment was calculated as the ratio of total donations to total sales. 
Though CSR investment in corporations is occasionally delivered by 
establishing exclusive foundations or reporting their CSR activities, we 
collected corporate donations data from each firm’s financial statements to use 
as the dependent variable, CSR investment. This measurement was used due to 
difficulties of determining actual expenditure on CSR investment through 
foundations or reports, whereas corporate donations provide objective data of 
corporate spending (Kang and Cheon, 2011); in other words, based on data 
availability and transparency related to CSR investment, corporate donations 
data might not be transferable with others (Choi et al., 2009). Furthermore, out 
of the total expenditure on CSR investment, corporate donations data are 
reported to be 53%, 54.9%, and 60.8% for 2008, 2009, and 2010 respectively 
according to the Korean Corporate Community Relations White Book, 




2) Independent variable 
Organizational slack 
Organizational slack was operated as the ratio of cash flow—operating income 
before depreciation minus the sum of interest, taxes, dividends—to total sales 
(Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Lang et al., 1991; Seifert et al., 2004). Researchers 
have sorted various forms of organizational slack, which includes excess of raw 
materials, machines, inventories, labor force, or many others; however, it has 
been widely agreed that the most discretionary resource of firms is cash 
(Sharfman et al., 1988; Arora and Dharwadka, 2011). 
3) Moderating variables 
i. Independent directors  
Independent outside directors indicate the directors who have no kind of 
relationships with the firm (Ayuso and Argandoña, 2007). Independent 
directors is measured as the ratio of independent directors to the total number 




ii. Anglo-Saxon directors  
Anglo-Saxon directors was measured as a dummy variable, showing the 
dominance of Anglo-Saxon directors among foreign directors. The Anglo-
Saxon directors are mostly from countries with shareholder-centered model, 
whereby non-Anglo-Saxon directors are likely to be influenced by stakeholder-
centered model of corporate governance. The variable was coded ‘1’ when the 
number of Anglo-Saxon directors are greater than that of non-Anglo-Saxon 
directors and ‘0’, otherwise. 
4)  Control variables 
To limit possible influences of corporate factors on the dependent variable, the 
effects of five variables were controlled for: firm size, firm age, firm 
performance, debt ratio, dividend, marketing intensity, and early period.  
Firm Size was calculated as the natural logarithm of total sales, and 
Firm Age was operated as the number of years from that the firm was established 
to the year of observation. Firm Performance, in addition, was presented as the 




influence on a firm’s CSR investment (Navarro, 1988; Waddock and Graves, 
1997).  
We also controlled Debt Ratio, calculated as the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. Dividend and Marketing Intensity were operationalized as the ratio 
of total dividend or marketing expenditure to total sales, respectively. Early 
Period, finally, was measured as a dummy variable, with being coded ‘1’ if 







V. RESULTS  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables uses in our 
models, including the sample sizes, means, standard deviations, minimums, and 
maximums. To avoid multicollinearity, we undertook the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) analysis. The mean VIF score was 1.48 with all of the scores 
being below 3.5; thus, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem since the 
common standard for it is 10 or fewer (Cohen et al. 2003).  
Table 2 presents the results of the analyses. Models 1 through 3 reports 
the test results of hypotheses developed above, while Models 4 and 5 shows 
results of robustness checks for model 2 and 3, respectively.  
Model 1 is the base model, which examined the relationship between 
firms’ organizational slack and CSR investment. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, 
a positive relationship was observed (β= 0.00305; p<0.05), indicating that the 
more uncommitted slack resources firms possess, the more  they are tend to 


















































































   
   
   













































































































































































































































































































































Table 2 Random effects estimates, 2008–2013
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(n=505) (n=8,985) (n=505) (n=505) (n=505)
Constant 0.00606 0.00238 ** 0.00120 0.00750 0.00397
(0.00585) (0.00078) (0.00527) (0.00582) (0.00550)
Firm age -0.00004 0.00000 -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00002
(0.00004) (0.00000) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Firm size -0.00037 -0.00010 * -0.00003 -0.00042 -0.00027
(0.00034) (0.00004) (0.00028) (0.00033) (0.00032)
Firm Performance 0.00001 0.00002 *** -0.00007 * 0.00002 -0.00006 *
(0.00003) (0.00000) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Debt ratio 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00009 0.00002 0.00009
(0.00013) (0.00002) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00013)
Dividend 0.00021 † 0.00000 0.00004 0.00018 0.00003
(0.00012) (0.00000) (0.00011) (0.00012) (0.00011)
Markting Intensity -0.00147 0.00705 *** 0.01512 0.00158 0.01477
(0.01622) (0.00180) (0.01540) (0.01610) (0.01537)
Early Period 0.00229 * 0.00020 * 0.00092 0.00210 * 0.00133
(0.00104) (0.00009) (0.00096) (0.00103) (0.00098)
Organizational Slack 0.00305 * -0.00074 * 0.03683 *** -0.01570 ** 0.03672 ***
(0.00122) (0.00031) (0.00428) (0.00603) (0.00428)
Independent Directors 0.00006 † 0.00001 *** 0.00004 0.00005 †
(0.00003) (0.00000) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Anglo-Saxon Directors -0.00058 -0.00016 -0.00057 -0.00042
(0.00111) (0.00103) (0.00110) (0.00104)
0.00002 * 0.00056 **
(0.00001) (0.00018)
-0.03606 *** -0.03584 ***
(0.00439) (0.00439)
Wald Chi-Square 19.490 ** 65.590 *** 85.580 *** 29.900 ** 88.870 ***
Standardized beta coefficients; standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, * p< .05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Organizational Slack ×
   Independent Directors
Organizational Slack ×




Model 2 examined the interaction effects of organizational slack and 
independent directors’ presentation on boards on firms’ CSR investment, testing 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b. We conducted contradictory hypotheses to determine 
boards of directors’ major role in firms’ decision making; the results showed the 
positive moderating effect of increasing proportion of independent directors on 
boards on slack-CSR relationship, supporting Hypothesis 2b (β=0.00002; 
p<0.05).  
Considering the complexity of this interaction effect, we illustrated 
interaction plots using lower and upper one standard deviations of independent 
directors’ representation on boards, as displayed in Figure 1.  
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the number of foreign directors from 
countries with shareholder-centered model of corporate law, if it is larger than 
the number of those who from countries with stakeholder-centered model of 
corporate law, would be negatively moderate the relationship between slack and 
CSR. The result provided in Model 3 indicates that Hypothesis 3 was supported, 




Figure 1 Moderating Effect of Independent 
Directors' Representation on Boards 
 
Figure 2 Moderating Effect of Anglo-Saxon 
Directors' More Representation than non-
Anglo-Saxon Directors on Boards 
 
In Figure 2, we can see the positive relationship between organizational 
slack and CSR investments being weakened, with the larger number of Anglo-
Saxon directors than that of non-Anglo-Saxon directors. 
Lastly, robustness tests were performed on the moderating effects of 
Independent Directors and Anglo-Saxon Directors. With Anglo-Saxon 
Directors variable included, Model 4 still reports the same result as seen from 
Model 2, supporting Hypothesis 2b (β=0.00056, p<0.01). Model 5, likewise, 
supports Hypothesis 3, showing the same results as seen from Model 3 (β= -
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Based on agency theory, resource dependence theory, and stakeholders theory, 
this study try to determine the major function of a board of directors in Korean 
firms, and possible changes in it caused by cultural factors. To answer the 
research questions, first, we examined the moderating effect of independent 
directors on the relationship between organizational slack and a firm’ CSR 
investment. Next, we explored the cultural influence on the role of the board by 
testing the moderating effect of Anglo-Saxon directors on slack-CSR 
relationship, when their representation on a board is more than that of Anglo-
Saxon directors.  
 Before examining the moderating effects of independent directors and 
Anglo-Saxon directors, we first retested the main effect—how organizational 
slack and CSR would be associated. Consistent with previous research results 
(e.g., Arora, 2008; Seifert et al., 2004; Buchholtz et al., 1999; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997), we found a positive relationship between slack resources and 




We then tested our main hypotheses; independent directors are found to 
strengthen the relationship between slack resources and CSR investment, 
supporting Hypothesis 2b. Based on the limited data available, our finding thus 
lends support for the resource dependence theory and stakeholders theory, 
suggesting that the board could be concluded as an advisor, instead of a 
monitoring body of the firm.  
Yet in a sense, these results are observed possibly because we 
established the study on Korean setting; drawing on cultural factors such as the 
country’s corporate law tradition, prime role of the board could appeal in 
different ways. This led our third hypothesis, which examined the moderating 
effect of Anglo-Saxon directors, who tended to follow shareholder-centered 
model of corporate governance tradition. The result shows that Anglo-Saxon 
directors negatively moderated the main effect when they exceeded non-Anglo-
Saxon directors in number, representing agency theory perspective.  
Although the main function of the board in Korea is proposed to be 




stakeholders theory, the finding that Anglo-Saxon directors still follow 
shareholder driven theory indicates cultural factors, including corporate law of 
countries, indeed do matter in determining the role of the board. These findings 
may lead to a better understanding of boards of directors’ roles, and the cultural 
effects on them. Reliance on these measures must be tempered, yet we only 
examined the foreign directors on boards in context of Korea, leading possible 
lacks in generalizability. Therefore, it is possible of course that comparative 
research across countries may produce somewhat different results. With more 
considerable data examined, future study could provide further scope on the 
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ABSTRACT IN KOREAN 
국문초록 
 
An Analysis of the Function of 
Boards of Directors:  
The moderating effect of BOD on the relationship 
between slack and CSR in Korean Firms 
 
본 연구는 기업의 중요한 전략적 결정 가운데 하나인 기업의 사회적 
책임(corporate social responsibility: CSR)투자에 영향을 미치는 기업 차원
의 요인들을 분석함으로써 한국 기업에서 이사회의 역할을 규명하고자 하
였다. 구체적으로 본 연구는 대리인 이론, 자원의존 이론, 이해관계자 이
론의 관점을 중심으로 기업의 사외이사와 영미권 지역 출신 이사들의 수
가 이사회에서 차지하는 비중이 기업의 여유자원(organizational slack)과 
CSR의 상관관계에 미치는 조절효과를 분석하였다. 한국의 1,662개 상장




여 실증 분석한 결과, 여유자원과 CSR의 긍정적인 관계는 사외이사 비중
의 증가에 따라 강화된 반면, 영미권 지역 출신 이사의 수가 기타 지역 출
신 이사의 수보다 많을 때에는 약화되었다. 상기와 같은 연구 결과는 이사
회의 핵심 역할을 설명하는 이론 중 자원의존 이론 및 이해관계자 이론을 
지지하며, 특히 한국 기업에서 이사회가 조언자, 혹은 자원 제공자로서 기
능함을 나타낸다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 이러한 이사회의 역할은 이사회 구
성원의 출신 국가 및 해당 국가의 기업법 전통에 의해 영향을 받고 변화할 
수 있음을 시사한다.  
 
주제어: 이사회; 기업 여유자원; 사회적 책임 활동; 대리인 이론; 자원의존 
이론; 이해관계자 이론 
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